Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co. Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38338 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-22-2012
Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co.
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38338
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38338" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3525.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3525
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent; 
JOHN E. BERRYHILL III, 
























Docket No. 38338-2010 
Ada County 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
----------------------------------) 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District County of Ada 
The Honorable Dennis E. Goff 
Senior District Judge Presiding at Trial 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Id 83616 
For Respondent-Cross Appellant 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
For Appellant-Cross Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ... ...... ... ... ...... ...... ...... .......... ......... IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................... . 
A. Nature of the Case ............................................................................. . 
B. The Course of the Proceedings ...................................................... " . ... ... 3 
C. Statement of Facts ................................................. ,. ............ ......... ...... 3 
ISSUES ON APPEAL...................................................................................... 23 
1. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling a contract existed as a matter of 
law and thereafter appropriately granted Mosell Equities' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on Count I? 
2. Whether Judge GatT was correct when ruling there was not evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have 
reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury and thereafter appropriately 
granted MoseH Equities' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict? 
3. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling prejudicial errors of law occurred 
at trial and thereafter appropriately granted Mosell Equities' motion for a new 
trial? 
4. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling the verdict is not in accord with 
his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence and thereafter appropriately 
granted Mosell Equities' motion for a new trial? 
5. Whether Judge Williamson and Judge Goff erred when ruling Dan Williams' 
letter was inadmissible according to Rule 408, IRE? 
6. Whether Mosell Equities is entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT......................................................................... 23 
I. JUDGE GOFF WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION 
FOR JNOV ON COUNT 1 BECAUSE OF A LEGAL ERROR......................... ..... 24 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - i 
A. IT WAS LEGAL ERROR NOT TO HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY THERE 
WAS AN EXPRESS CONTRACT......................................................... 24 
B. A JNOV MOTION IS ADELA YEO MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT............... 25 
C. JUDGE GOFF RULED CORRECTLY THERE WAS AN EXPRESS 
CONTRACT.. ... . .. . . .. ... .... . .... . .. ... . .. ..... . ... ... ... ...... ... .. .... ... . .. .... .. .. . . .. ... 25 
II. JUDGE GOFF ALSO CORRECTLY GRANTED MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION 
JNOV BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT ..................................................................................... 27 
III. JUDGE GOFF PROPERLY GRANTED MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL.......................................... ...................................................... 29 
A. PREJUDICIAL ERRORS WARRANT A NEW TRIAL - I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7)........ ... 29 
B. THE VERDICT WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE - I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)............................................................ 30 
IV. DAN WILLIAMS' LETTER IS ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH BERRyHILL.......... 33 
A TTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.................. ...................................................... 34 
CONCLUSION......... ..................................................................................... 34 
CROSS APPEAL............................................................................................ 35 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL.......................................................... 35 
1. Whether Judge Goff should have granted Mosell Equities' Motion for 
JNOV on Count 1 in its entirety and found both a contract and breach of 
that contract? 
2. Whether Mosell Equities is entitled to attorney fees on Cross Appeal? 
ARGUMENT................................................................................................ 35 
1. BERRYHILL CONCEDES IF THERE WAS A LOAN, THEN THERE WAS A 
BREACH............................................................................................ 36 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - ii 
II. THERE IS NO DISPUTE NO BUY -IN DID OR COULD HAVE OCCURRED 
BECAUSE BERRYHILL REFUSED TO FINALIZE THE BUY-IN DOCUMENTS... 37 
III. BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE IS WITHOUT MERIT.......... 37 
IV. BERRYHILL'S "NO MEETING OF THE MINDS" DEFENSE WARRANTS 
RESCISSION....................................................................................... 38 
ATTORNEY FEES ON CROSS APPEAL......... ..................................................... 40 
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................................................ 41 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - iii 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Bratton v. Scott, Supreme Court Doc. No. 36275, p. 4-5 (2011)................. ... 27 
Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797, 134 P.3d 648, (2006).. 29,30 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 
218 (2001).. ... ....... ... ........ .... ... .... ....... ....... ............ ... ... ... ... ........ ... 34,40 
High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 234 PJd 747, (2010).... 23 
Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 
65 P.3d 509, (2003)....................................... ............................ ... 28 
Mountainvie,"v Landowners Co-Op. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861,136 P.3d 332, 
(2006)......................................................................................... 31 
O'Connor v. Harger Consf., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846, (2008)........ .... 39 
Quick v. Crane, III Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, (1986)............................... 25,29,30 
Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho 357, 597 P.2d 600, (1979)........................... 39 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,93 P.3d 685, (2004)....... 25,36 
Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59,63, 175 P.3d 748, 752, (2007).. 26 
I.C. §12-120(3)................................................ .............................. 34,40 
I.R.C.P. 50(b) ...................................................... '" ... ......... ... .... ... 25 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)............................................................................ 29, 30 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7)............................................................................ 29,30 
I.R.E. 408.................................................................................... 34 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involved a business dispute between two experienced businessmen, John 
Berryhill and Glenn Mosel!. There is no disagreement that Glenn Mosell's company Mosell 
Equities paid Berryhill & Company, Inc., $405,000.00 based on John Berryhill's promise of 
equity in Berryhill & Co. 
Berryhill had two lawyers draft "buy-in" documents, but then refused to sign the 
documents or transfer any interest to Mosell Equities even after testifying in a separate case that 
Mosell Equities had paid the requisite amount for the buy-in. Although Berryhill had written a 
document identifying Mosell Equities' first buy-in installment as a "loan," and although 
Berryhill thereafter accepted nine more checks from Mosell Equities, eight of which were 
marked "loan," and although John Berryhill accounted for all of these payments as loans from 
Mosell Equities on the Berryhill & Company, Inc. financial records, when Mosell Equities asked 
that Berryhill either sign the buy-in documents or repay the loaned funds, Berryhill claimed there 
never was a loan and refused to transfer the promised equity. During the trial, although Berryhill 
continuously testified that the term "loan" he wrote in Exhibit 1 really did not mean a loan, 
Berryhill never provided an explanation as to what Berryhill believed the term "loan" meant. 
Nor was Berryhill ever able to identify just what he believed were the terms of the buy-in. 
Berryhill contended at trial that everything he did was premised on a "development 
project" called Polo Cove, which Berryhill himself described as an "amoeba" and as "ever 
changing." Berryhill had identified the Polo Cove project and several other possible projects as 
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potential opportunities that he and Mosell would pursue once they joined forces. The Polo Cove 
project never broke ground. At trial, Berryhill claimed to be a "partner" in the Polo Cove 
project, yet could not identify the other partners. When asked about the terms of any alleged 
contract related to Polo Cove, Berryhill admitted there were no terms. Finally, Berryhill 
conceded that Mosell never guaranteed or promised that the Polo Cove project would succeed. 
When Mosell Equities' counsel sent a demand letter to Berryhill in February 2009, 
requesting that Berryhill repay the loan, Berryhill responded through counsel on April 2, 2009 
and asserted there was no loan, there was never any buy-in, and that Mosell Equities' money was 
really an "investment by Mosell Equities, LLC, in a speculative venture dealing with the 
proposed development of Polo Cove near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho." I At trial 
however, Berryhill contended that Mosell failed to "consummate the deal" because Mosell had 
not paid the buy-in amount. Berryhill could not however identify just what amount Mosell 
Equities was supposed to have paid. 
Judge Goff stated when granting Mosell Equities' Motions for JNOV and New Trial that 
he had been "shocked" by jury verdicts only twice in his 27 years on the bench-the Berryhill 
verdict being the second. 
1 Dan William's letter is located at R. Vol. I, p. 126~128. Judge Williamson ruled the letter was not admissible 
according to Rule 408, IRE. Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
R. Vol. I, p. 752-753. Berryhill filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Williams' letter that Judge Goff granted during 
the pretrial conference, which was not recorded. While no order was entered, the parties discussed Judge Goffs 
ruling on the record during trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 296, L. 19 to p. 300, L. 5. 
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B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
The Respondent agrees the Appellant has correctly stated the proceedings in paragraphs 
1-6 of the Course of Proceedings section of the Appellant's Brief. 
The Respondent adds that it filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on December 17, 2010. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
LOAN MEANS LOAN 
On June 28, 2007 Glenn Mosell wrote Check No. 5127 to "Berryhill & Co." for 
$50,000.00 and wrote "loan" conspicuously on the "memo" line of that check. (Exhibits 1 and 
2.) 
Berryhill then took that check and made a copy. Below the copy of the check, Berryhill 
wrote, "This is a loan .... " He concluded with the statement, "It will be transitioned into part of 
Glenn's 'buy in' of MoBerry Ventures Corp. Inc." Both Berryhill and Mosell signed the 
agreement. (Exhibit 1.) 
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(Both Check No. 5127 and the attached note above constituted Exhibit 1) 
Mosell testified he asked Berryhill to write the note as "security for my "50,000.00 
check," that Mosell believed the funds remained a loan because that was the agreement and 
Berryhill accounted for Mosell Equities' funds as debt on the Berryhill & Co. books. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 315, L. 3, to p. 318, L. 11. 
Thereafter, over the next ten months, Glenn Mosell personally delivered nine other 
checks, which Mosell Equities asserted at trial constituted the funds for Mosell Equities' buy-in 
of half of Berryhill & Co. Mosell testified that he understood the the money would remain as a 
loan pending the transition to an ownership interest. 
P. 317 [Mosell Testifying] 
10 Q. Did the - did the buy-in ever occur 
11 mister - Mr. Mosell? 
12 A. It did not. 
13 Q. Okay. Was it part of the deal that-
14 well, you said it was a loan, and then what was your 
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15 understanding of the trans - the transition? 
16 A. I would make loans to the company, the loans 
17 would be recorded on the company books. And they would 
18 either be repaid to me, as a loan would be, or that loan 
19 would be converted to equity or stock in Berryhill & 
20 Company, and that was the understanding. 
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Mosell testified he wrote "loan" on the checks because at the time he and Berryhill were 
contemplating the buy-in an attorney, Kim Gourley, was working on the documents that 
provided Mosell Equities would pay $387,000.00 for 50% of Berryhill & Co., and because 
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Berryhill had found the downtown restaurant space, Berryhill asked Mosell to "front the money." 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 10 to p. 235, L. 17 and p. 237, L. 3 to p. 239, L. 2. 
Mosell also testified that the first time he heard that Berryhill was disputing the funds 
were a loan was in response to a demand for repayment sent to Mosell Equities' attorney in April 
2009. Tr. Vol. I, p. 318, L. 19 to p. 320, L. 8. 
BERRYHILL TREATED MOSELL EQUITIES' MONEY AS A LOAN 
Mosell testified the he hand delivered each check, (Exhibits 1-10), to Berryhill and 
Berryhill accepted each check. Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 1 to p. 339, L. 2. 
Joy Luedtke was the the General Manager and bookkeeper for Berryhill & Co. from 
October 2007 through October 2008. Luedtke said she became the General Manager in October 
2007, after Mosell Equities had already provided over $200,000.00 to Berryhill & Co. Luedtke 
recalled what when she received a check in October 2007 she created a bookkeeping "equity" 
account for Mosell Equities because she thought Mosell and Berryhill "were already partners." 
She testified that Mosell approached her and asked her to correct the error and to place the 
money in the long-term liability account that Berryhill has already created regarding the Mosell 
Equities' loans. Luedtke confirmed that she made the correction after she "cleared it with John 
[Berryhill]." Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, L. 9, to p. 270, L. 7. 
Luedtke confirmed that she as the Berryhill & Co. bookkeeper always accounted for the 
money received from Mosell Equities as a loan to Berryhill & Co and did so after verifying that 
doing so was appropriate with Berryhill and with Amy Dempsey, CPA, Berryhill & Co's 
accountant. Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, L. 9 to p. 270, L. 7. 
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Luedtke also testified that Exhibit 53 was in error. Tr. Vol. I, p. 271, L. 2 to p. 272, L. 
7. As of June 2008, Berryhill & Co. was correctly reporting Mosell Equities' contributions of 
$385,000.00 as long-term liabilities (debt), but the figure should have been the full $405,000.00 
paid as of June 2008. 
(Excerpt from Exhibit 53.) 
Luedtke stated that had the buy-in occurred, she would have made an accounting entry 
closing out the Mosell Equities' long-term liability account and creating an "equity" account 
reflecting Mosell Equities' ownership interest, but that she never was asked to make any such 
changes. Tr. Vol. I, p. 275, L. 4-9. 
When Mosell approached Berryhill in September 2008 regarding Mosell Equities' 
money, Luedtke explained that she had conversations with Berryhill about Mosell's request and 
that she and Berryhill reviewed possible sources of repayment. Tr. Vol. I, p. 284, L. 8-24. 
Luedtke also stated that Berryhill never told her, at any time while she was the Berryhill 
& Co. general manager, that Berryhill disputed Berryhill & Co. owed the money to Mosell 
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Equities or that Berryhill asserted Mosell Equities' money was not a loan. Tr. Vol. I, p. 285, L. 
3-5. 
Amy Dempsey, Berryhill & Co.'s CPA, responded to Berryhill's inquiry regarding the 
Mosell Equities' money in an e-mail dated March 5, 2008 and referred to Mosell Equities' 
money "on the books" as a loan. (Exhibit 37.) 
>Hi Juhn 
Mosell Equities also paid Berryhill & Co. an additional $20,000.00 to cover other 
expenses. (Exhibits 16-17.) 
"GLENN'S BUY -IN" NEVER OCCURRED 
During the trial, Berryhill testified that he accepted over $400,000 from Mosell Equities, 
and although Berryhill wrote "this is a loan" on Exhibit 1, and thereafter received and accepted 
eight more checks conspicuously marked "loan," that the funds were not really loans. 
P.788 [by Mr. Williams] 
10 Q. Referring again to Exhibit 1, when - when 
11 Mr. Mosell said, we have to call it something, what did 
12 you understand him to mean? 
13 MR. CLARK: Asked and answered; objection. 
14 THE COURT: I'll let it go, but it's 
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15 counting against his five minutes, which are almost up. 
16 THE WITNESS: I understood Glenn to say that 
17 it was not a loan, but we had to call it something, so 
18 we could put it on the books and just park it so it 
19 wouldn't have - it wouldn't have to move until we 
20 signed the documents, and put it on a specific tax year. 
21 It could sit there. 
While Berryhill claims Mosell told him "we have to call it something," Berryhill was 
unable to articulate just what he believed the funds would constitute if the buy-in did not occur. 
Berryhill testified that Exhibits 19,20 and 21 memorialized negotiations between 
Berryhill and Mosell and that ultimately he believed the parties had agreed to the terms stated in 
Exhibit 21. Tr. Vol. I, p. 644, L. 11 to p. 644, L. 18; p. 705, L. 3-18; and p. 778, L. 13-22. 
In March 2007, Berryhill and Mosell met with Attorney Kim Gourley who drafted 
proposed buy-in and requisite corporate forms. However, Mr. Gourley did not finalize the 
documents until October 2008. Mr. Gourley testified that in March 2007 the game plan was for 
Mosell to pay in cash, as consideration for the buy-in to a proposed company named "MoBerry", 
and that MoBerry would then loan the cash to Berryhill & Company, Inc. Tr. Vol. I, p. 848, L. 
21 to p. 849 L. 23. 
By the end of December 2007, Mosell Equities had provided and Berryhill had accepted 
nine checks totaling $385,000.00, all of which were marked "loan." (Exhibits 1-10.) 
Mosell and Berryhill never signed the Gourley documents, (Exhibit 34.), and thereafter 
sought additional advice from accountant/attorney Victoria Meier. Mosell stated he and 
Berryhill did not sign the Gourley Documents because of a "tax issue" related to whether they 
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needed to create an additional entity that would then own Berryhill's existing company. Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 179, L. 10 to p. 182, L. 1. 
Meier drafted certain corporate documents after meeting with Mosell and Berryhill in 
January 2008. (Exhibit 35.) Mosell testified that Meier advised a simpler approach was to 
eliminate "MoBerry, Inc." Tr. Vol. I, p. 249, L. 14 to p. 251, L. 6. Based on Mosell and 
Berryhill's discussions with Meier, she drafted several corporate documents that identified her 
understanding of what had transpired between Mosell and Berryhill as of their meeting in 
January 2008. 
Special Meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
BERRYHILL..\ COMPANY, INC. 
SPECIAl. MEETING OF THE 
BOARD 01·' DIRECrORS ASP SnAREllOLDERS 
Effective the De.ct'mber 31, 2007 
BERRYHIlL & COPvrPANY, LN'C an Idaho 
thi" instrument evidences Ihe 3etions and resolullons und<!rtaken 
the Boord of [)ireC(O,5 and ()( the Present was 
Shareholder and the Directors who waived norice 
in the 
Stock Purchase Document 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agreement") is made and entered into 
effective the ___ day of • 2007. by and between BERRYHILL & COMPANY~ 
INC., an Idaho corporation (the "Corporation"), and GLENN E. MOSELL. a married man dealing with 
his separate property ("Mosell"), 
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WIT N E SSE T H: 
WHEREAS, John BerryhiIJ (the "Shareholder") is the sole shareholder and record owner of two 
hundred (200) shares, $1,00 par value, of the issued and outstanding common capital srock of BERRYHIlL 
& CO~M'Y.INC., rut Idaho corporation <hereinafter the ··Corporation·~). John Berryhill's shares represent 
one hundred percent (100%) of liJ: ili~uoo and outstanding common capital stock of the Corporanon and are 
evidenced hy Certificates No. I and No, 2. 
lVHEREAS. duringJh~~alendaryear of 2007, MosellJQaned the Comoration Four Hund~ 
Thousand Dollars ($400,000) to fund the relocation of the Comoration's restaurant and for capital 
improvements needed for the Comoration's restaurant and banquet room~ 
WHEREAS. Lb~ Curpuralt(}l! desires Lu issut: l wu ht,!!ldred (200). l>liares ~ of lhe CU.!I'~r:~!!~[I~); 
common capital stock toMQ~Jl as repayment of the LOJm. Mosell desire5 to accept the two hundred 
(200) shares of the Corporation' s common capital srock as.!~ID'ment of th~-.1Q.<l!l~ an<:!~rQ._b~'!:\!~ the Loan 
reclassified on the COl;poration'~ hooks and record~ as a capital contrihutlon trom Mosel!. 
WHEREAS. <lfter the~~~jecuti<ln. of tl! is Agreement. Mose:!! ll!!.£1- the S~(l~~holder will __ ~~~~~ 
fif!l~!£t:!llt (50%) or!!~~_£2mnloul:ap~!!Ls!~k ufw_t:~~2m2rali2!!· 
Satisfaction of Loan Doument 
SATISF ACTION OF LOAN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property, does hereby certify and declare that the l:t:rlain Loan 
in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand DoUars ($400,000) made and entered into by 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, an Idaho ,..nrrv.rn as "horrower". to GLENN R. MOSELL, 
------------------------------~--------------
as "lender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
DATED: ____ , 200_. 
Glenn E. MoseH 
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The "buy-in" terms identified and confirmed in the Meier documents were consistent 
with Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case that Mosell Equities had already paid in 
the required funds and all that was left was to sign the appropriate documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 445, 
L. 4 to p. 448, L. 13. 
Mosell testified that he had agreed to increase the buy-in figure to $400,000.00, which 
Meier indicated in her documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 251, L 7 to p. 256, L. 16. 
After the Meier meeting in January 2008, the owners in the Broadway Park case deposed 
Mosell, who testified in that case the funds were a loan that were to be converted, but if the 
conversion did not occur, Mosell was to receive his money back. Mosell also confirmed 
Berryhill was present at Mosell's deposition, which occurred a week after Berryhill's Broadway 
Park deposition and that Berryhill never questioned MoselI's testimony. Tr. Vol. I, p. 259, L. 1-
14. 
According to Exhibit 21, Berryhill was to personally receive $50,000.00 cash, which he 
paid himself on January 25, 2008. (Exhibit 23.) 
At trial, Berryhill claimed that Mosell had not paid the "full amount" agreed upon for the 
buy-in, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 616, L. 18-22), yet Berryhill repeatedly testified he was acting as if the 
terms of Exhibit 21 controlled the relationship. 
Berryhill also claimed he refused to sign the Meier documents because the documents 
were not correct. However, Berryhill could not identify what he believed was missing from or 
needed to be added to the Meier documents to represent what Berryhill believed were the terms 
of the agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 452, 1. 18 to p. 456, L. 14. 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - 14 
During cross examination, MoseH testified there was no "transition" because when he 
approached Berryhill about converting the funds to stock in Berryhill & Co., "John Berryhill 
denied the conversion. So they [the loaned funds] remained a loan." Tr. Vol. I, p. 323, L. 19-
24. 
Berryhill conceded at trial that he understood Mosell Equities did not intend to just give 
the money to Berryhill if the transition did not occur. 
P. 482 [by Mr. Clark Berryhill Testifying] 
4 Q. Did you tell Mr. Berry - or Mr. Mosell that 
5 if there's no transition to the buy-in, that you got to 
6 keep the money that he had given you? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. And but he asked for it back? 
9 A. No, he didn't. 
10 Q. He didn't ask for the money back? 
11 A. No. Not until the lawsuit. 
12 Q. There wasn't a letter from Mr. Berryhill -
13 Mr. Mosell's Counsel in Jan - January or February 
14 of'09? 
15 A. Initial -- that was the start of the 
16 lawsuit. That's what I'm referring to. 
17 Q. Was - was that the - what you consider the 
18 lawsuit? 
19 A. That was the start of it, yes. 
20 Q. And and you, in response, denied that the 
21 funds were ever a loan, and denied any liability, and 
22 refused to pay Mr. Mosell back. 
23 A. That's correct. They were never a loan. 
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were 
25 funds, in your mind? 
P. 483 [by Mr. Clark] 
1 He was buying into my business. 
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While denying the funds were a loan, and contending Mosell Equities was buying equity 
in Berryhill's "business," there is no dispute that Berryhill refused to transfer any equity. 
Berryhill claimed the "buy-in" document drafted by Victoria Meier, Berryhill & Co. 's own 
counsel, were incorrect, but he testified he did not sign the Meier documents "because we never 
got to that point." Tf. Vol. 1, p. 450, L. 16 to p. 451, L. 2. 
Neither of Berryhill & Co.'s attorneys, Gourley or Meier, although having met with 
Berryhill before drafting their respective documents, (Exhibits 34 and 35.), included any 
language referencing Polo Cove. 
BERRYHILL REFUSED TO REPAY THE FUNDS 
Notwithstanding Berryhill's testimony at trial that there was no loan and that Mosell 
Equities was paying for equity which Berryhill refused to transfer, when Mosell Equities 
demanded that Berryhill either perform and consummate the buy-in or repay the loan, Berryhill 
responded through counsel that the funds were not a loan nor had Mosell Equities purchased any 
equity. 
P. 318 [Mosell Testifying] 
A. Yes. 
23 Q. And was it - what - just sum - in 
24 summarizing, was there a demand made for the return of 
25 the $405,000? 
P.319 
A. Yes. 
2 Q. And that - that's what you directed your 
3 attorney to make a demand for? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. And -- and was there - did -- did you -
6 did your attorney ultimately receive a response back 
7 from an attorney representing Mr. and Mrs. Berryhill? 
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8 A. From Dan Williams. 
9 Q. And let me see if - the - the response 
10 says, first and foremost the funds described in your 
II letter and claimed by Mr. Mosell or Mosell Equities, 
12 LLC, did not constitute a loan to John Berryhill or 
13 Berryhill & Company, Inc. , Berryhill and - in quotes, 
14 Berryhill or Berryhill & Company, unquote. 
Both Judge Williamson and Judge Goff ruled that Dan Williams' letter (a copy of which 
is attached for the Court's convenience) was not admissible, even to impeach. This appears to be 
error as Berryhill testified that he believed Mosell Equities was "buying into my business," but 
Williams' letter clearly contradicts that contention. Berryhill denied any loan, never mentioned 
equity or the "buy-in," and claimed Mosell Equities' money was merely, " ... an investment by 
Mosell Equities, LLC in a speculative venture dealing with the proposed development of Polo 
Cove near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho," all of which Berryhill apparently gets to keep. 
BERRYHILL'S VISION 
While contending Mosell was the driving force of the relationship, it was Berryhill with 
the "vision." Berryhill outlined his two year "vision" in a document he provided to Glenn 
Mosell in 2007. (Exhibit 18.) 
Berryhill envisioned, among other things, that he and Mosell would form a corporation 
and have equal ownership. Berryhill also envisioned moving his restaurant, then located in a 
strip mall on Broadway in Boise, downtown where he would also have banquet facilities and a 
wine bar. The relevant excerpts of Exhibit 18: 
• Berryhill and Mosell would form a company called "MB Incorporated (MBl)" as a 
"50/50 partnership." 
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• MBI would then purchase Berryhill & Co., Incorporated (Berryhill's current company 
which owns the restaurant.) 
• MBI would purchase the Broadway Strip Mall. 
• MBI would find a suitable downtown location for Berryhill's restaurant and Wine Bar. 
• BCQ would expand its location at Broadway Park, enlarge the BCQ and Gourmet to Go 
(GTG) catering offices and maintain the Special Events Catering and (GTG) catering 
Business at that location. BCQ would move its existing restaurant facilities (Cafe) 
downtown and establish a "Wine Bar" and "banquet facilities". 
• MBI would also open another restaurant and catering business in Eagle, Donnelly and 
"other locations." 
• MBI would create another company called Polo Cove Resort Services that would open a 
restaurant as part of the first phase of the Polo Cove Resort. 
Berryhill conceded at trial that a sexy, flashy, high-end restaurant located downtown 
would potentially have benefitted all of opportunities Berryhill envisioned in Exhibit 18, not just 
Polo Cove. Tr. Vol. I, p. 722, L. 17 to p. 723, L. 3. 
BROAD\VAY PARK LITIGATION 
Berryhill's vision to purchase the "Broadway Strip Mall" ultimately resulted in 
litigation? While the cases are separate, Berryhill's deposition testimony given in the Broadway 
Park Litigation is material and relevant to the issues presented on appeal. 
Mosell Equities and Berryhill signed a Purchase and Sale Agreement to purchase the 
Broadway Park mall on August 15, 2006. Mosell Equities deposited $50,000.00 as earnest 
2 John Berryhill, et al. vs. Broadway Park, Inc., et aI., Ada County Case No., CY-OC-0701047 which was 
consolidated with First American Title Insurance Company, Inc vs. John Berryhill, et aI., Ada County Case No., 
CY -OC 0700987. Ultimately the consolidated cases were dismissed with prejudice on February 14, 2008. Mosell 
Equities forfeited its $50,000.00 earnest money deposit. 
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money for the purchase. A dispute arose after the due diligence period had expired and Mosell 
Equities and Berryhill sought to rescind the agreement. When the owners refused, Mosel! 
Equities and Berryhill tiled suit on January 17,2007. Tr. Vol. I, p. 175, L. 18 to p. 178, L. 1. 
The mall owners asserted that Mosell Equities and Berryhill lacked funds to close, and 
claimed that the lack of money was the true motivation to rescind the purchase and sale contract, 
not any claimed breach by the owners. Tr. Vol. I, p. 257, L. 16-24 
On January 30, 2008, during his deposition, Berryhill answered questions regarding the 
Mosell - Berryhill relationship and potential sources for payment for purchasing the Broadway 
Park center. Specifically, Berryhill testified that Polo Cove was an "amoeba" and "ever 
changing." Tr. Vol. I, p. 458, L. 1-14. Berryhill also testified that as of January 2008, Berryhill 
had "pushed away" for the last six months and was not directly involved with the Polo Cove 
project. Tr. Vol. L p. 534, L. 2 to p. 535, L. 24. 
Berryhill also testified as noted above that Mosell Equities had already paid in the 
requisite amount to purchase 50% of Berryhill & Co.3 
THE MOVE DOWNTOWN 
Berryhill testified repeatedly at trial that essentially everything was Mosell's idea, 
including moving the restaurant downtown and then eventually taking over other space in the 
Plaza 121 building which was formally the Crackerbox Furniture Store. 
3 Berryhill's entire Broadway Park Deposition Transcript is in the record at R. p. 517-577. Mosell's Broadway Park 
Deposition Transcript is at R. p. 578-619. 
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Although Berryhill testified he was happy at the Broadway Park location and had no 
desire to relocate back into downtown Boise before meeting Mosell, Mary Gendron, the General 
Manager for Berryhill & Co, who started when Berryhill & Co. was in the first downtown 
location and worked until the end of June 2007, testified that Berryhill always wanted to move 
back downtown from the Broadway Park location and he had communicated that desire to her 
before Berryhill met Mosel!. Tr. Vol. I, p. 388, L. 7 to p. 389, L. 9. 
The General Manager following Mary Gendron, Joy Luedtke, testified that Berryhill told 
her it was a joint decision between Berryhill and Mosell to take over the furniture store. Tr. Vo!' 
I, p. 275, L. 25 to p. 276, L. 20. 
Berryhill moved his catering operations and his executive offices into the Crackerbox 
space, and created the banquet facilities he envisioned in Exhibit 18. 
Of the total amount of the Crackerbox space, the Polo Cove office involved 1,200 square 
feet. Tr. Vol. I, p. 495 L. 7-14.4 
Mr. Taunton, a consultant for the Polo Cove project (discussed below) testified that he 
did not get the impression or have any belief that the only reason the Berryhill & Co. restaurant 
was moved downtown was to further the Polo Cove project as Berryhill contended. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
205, L. 18-22. 
Mosell testified that in 2008 when it appeared that the Polo Cove project was not going 
forward, at least in the near term, he approached Berryhill about subletting the Polo Cove space 
4 Berryhill has is using this space now as his Berryhill's Bacon restaurant. 
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to cover costs. However, Berryhill refused to allow the sublease. Tr. Vol. I, p. 246, L. 6 to p. 
247, L. ] 1. 
THE POLO COVE PRO.JECT 
Berryhill claimed that the move downtown and everything else he did was all related to 
"Polo Cove." However, when asked about the terms of any alleged agreement between Mosell 
or Mosel! Equities and John Berryhill or Berryhill & Co, Berryhill conceded there were no terms 
to the alleged contract. 
P470 [Berryhill testifying] 
15. Q. What was your agreement? That's what I'm 
16 trying to get to you. 
17 A. Polo Cove. 
18 Q. Well, okay. You both had an agreement about 
19 Polo Cove. What were the terms of the agreement about 
20 Polo Cove? 
21 A. There was nothing written down. 
22 Q. Okay. So, you had an agreement about 
23 Polo Cove with no terms? 
24 A. That's correct. 
Berryhill also admitted that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the success of Polo 
Cove, which was but one of the opportunities Berryhill documented in his vision. (Exhibit 18.) 
P475 [Berryhill testifying] 
15 Q. Okay. You're not - you're not contending 
16 and - and you're fair, in your deposition you answered 
17 this correctly - or succinctly. And I asked you 
18 point blank, do you believe Mr. Mosel! or Mos -
19 Mosell Equities guaranteed to you the success of 
20 Polo Cove or anything that was associated with 
21 Polo Cove? 
22 A. No. 
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Between 2005 and February 2007 Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for his 
consulting work on the Polo Cove project. (Exhibits 12~15.) 
The Berryhill Restaurant had its grand opening in August 2007, and Berryhill testified in 
the Broadway Park litigation in January 2008, that he had "pushed back" from the Polo Cove 
Project and had not worked on Polo Cove for the last six months. Tr. Vol. I, p. 534, L. 2 to p. 
535, L. 24. 
Notwithstanding Berryhill's admission that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the 
success of Polo Cove, or the fact that Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for consulting, 
or the fact that Berryhill admitted he had not been working on the Polo Cove project for the last 
half of2007, Berryhill presented evidence at trial that his "name" and "reputation" somehow 
added value to the failed Polo Cove project. However, Berryhill ultimately conceded that even 
his "name" could not save or resuscitate the project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 733, L. 10 to p. 734 , L. 1l. 
Robert Taunton, who has a master's degree in land planning, and who has 30 years 
experience in land development, testified that he was involved in the Polo Cove project as a 
consultant. Tr. Vol. I, p. 195, L. 11 to p. 196, L 3. Mr. Taunton testified that he believed Polo 
Cove was a "viable project," and he could not blame anyone for the lack of the project's success. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, L. 25 to p. 203, L. 19. 
The reality, Polo Cove was a great idea. However, like many other development ventures 
at the time, it fell victim to the economic collapse in 2008. While there were some high-quality 
prospectuses, (Exhibits 44 and 45), Mr. Taunton confirmed the project never broke ground. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 202, L. 20 to p. 203, L. 19. 
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Judge Goff, when deciding the post-trial motions and after hearing the testimony and 
analyzing all of the evidences, stated, "Well, Polo Cove is really nothing. It was a dream in the 
first place .... " JNOV Tr. p. 19, L. 7-8. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
]. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling a contract existed as a matter of law 
and thereafter appropriately granted Mosell Equities' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on Count I? 
2. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling there was not evidence of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar 
conclusion to that of the jury and thereafter appropriately granted Mosell Equities' 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict? 
3. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling prejudicial errors of law occurred at 
trial and thereafter appropriately granted Mosel! Equities' motion for a new trial? 
4. Whether Judge Goff was correct when ruling the verdict is not in accord with his 
assessment of the clear weight of the evidence and thereafter appropriately granted 
Mosell Equities' motion for a new trial? 
5. Whether Judge Williamson and Judge Goff erred when ruling Dan Williams' letter 
was inadmissible according to Rule 408, IRE? 
6. Whether Mosell Equities is entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
Berryhill states his entire case in one sentence in his Brief, the same contention he 
asserted throughout the proceedings; "The document l Exhibit 1] is silent as to the parties' intent 
as to what happens if, for any reason, the transition does not occur," (Appellant's Brief. p. 26.), 
so Berryhill claims therefore the language in Exhibit 1 is somehow ambiguous. However, the 
three questions Berryhill failed to answer at trial and still has not answered are: 
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1. If loan does not mean loan, then what does Berryhill think it meant? 
2. What were the terms of the "buy-in"? 
3. If the "transition" or "buy-in" did not occur, (which neither party disputes), then what 
did Berryhill believe was to happen to Mosell Equities' money? 
Until Berryhill can provide a reasoned alternative interpretation to the plain language in 
Exhibit 1, the contract means the parties intended a loan that would be transitioned into a buy-in 
which may occur in the future flthe parties agreed to the buy-in terms, and tlthe buy-in did not 
occur, then the funds would remain a loan, just as Mosell testified at trial, and just as Berryhill 
accounted for the Exhibit 1 funds and the rest of the checks Mosell Equities paid on the Berryhill 
& Co. financial records. 
I. JUDGE GOFF WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION 
FOR JNOV ON COUNT 1 BECAUSE OF A LEGAL ERROR. 
Judge Goff identified two bases for granting Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV; as a 
matter of law an express contract existed and there was not sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict. 
A. IT WAS LEGAL ERROR NOT TO HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY THERE WAS 
AN EXPRESS CONTRACT. 
A District Court has authority to grant a motion for JNOV if legal error occurred at trial. 
In High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 234 P.3d 747, (2010), the Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed the District Court's denial of a motion JNOV, and held as a matter of 
law there was no fiduciary duty. If no fiduciary duty existed as a matter oflaw then the jury's 
subsequent ruling that such a relationship existed was irrelevant. In other words, the Court 
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below should have ruled as a matter of law and granted the motion for JNOV regardless of the 
jury's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed. 
Judge Goff ruled in granting JNOV that it was legal error not to have instructed the jury 
that an express contract existed. JNOV Tr. p. 95, L. 20 to p. 96, L. 15. Having ruled a legal 
error had occurred, the jury instructions or the resulting verdict were irrelevant. 
B. A JNOV MOTION IS A DELAYED MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
"A motion for judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) is treated as simply a delayed 
motion for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same." Quick v. Crane, III Idaho 
759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191, (1986). Judge Goff stated that Mosel! Equities had filed a 
motion for JNOV under I.R.c.P. 50(b), that he was considering the motion under this rule, and 
then proceeded to rule that as a matter of law a contract existed. JNOV Tr. p. 102, L. 6-12, and 
p. 104, L. 2-4. 
Berryhill spends a significant amount of his Appellant's Brief arguing jury instruction 
issues. Berryhill's argument however ignores the reality that a motion for JNOV is merely a 
delayed motion for directed verdict. Jury instructions under the circumstances are immaterial 
and irrelevant if, as did Judge Goff~ the Court had a legal basis to grant a directed verdict, but did 
so at the JNOV stage of the proceedings. 
C. JUDGE GOFF RULED CORRECTLY THERE WAS AN EXPRESS CONTRACT. 
Judge Goff found that the phrase "This is a loan ... " was not ambiguous. 
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous on its face must be decided 
by giving the words or phrases used their ordinary meanings. Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho, 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004). A party's 
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subjective, undisclosed interpretation of a word or phrase cannot make the 
contract ambiguous. If it could; then all contracts would be rendered ambiguous 
merely by a party asserting a misunderstanding of the meaning of one or more of 
the words used." 
"The intent of the parties is determined from the plain meaning of the words." 
Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 14] Idaho 117, 120, 106 
P.3d 443, 446 (2005). A contract is not rendered ambiguous on its face because 
one of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed 
from the ordinary meaning of those words. As explained in 17 A AmJur.2d, 
Contracts, § 348 (2004): 
If the language used by the parties is plain, complete, and unambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be gathered from that, language, arid from that 
language alone, no matter what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may 
have been. Presumptively, the intent of the parties to a contract is expressed by 
the natural and ordinary meaning of their language referable to it, and such 
meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts through construction, for 
the parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state. Only when 
the language of the contract is ambiguous maya court turn to extrinsic evidence 
of the contracting parties' intent. 
Swanson v. Beco Consl. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752, (2007). 
Several times during the trial, Judge Goff had to admonish Berryhill and direct him to 
answer the questions asked. "The attorney asks the question, you cannot reword the question. 
You have to answer the question and not volunteer answers; okay? I put up with it yesterday for 
several hours, I'm not putting up with it today." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 529, L. 13-16. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 578, 
L. 4-24. Tr. Vol. ], p. 727, L. 15 to p. 728, L. 4. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 731, L. 18-23. However, despite 
the repeated questions and evasive answers, Berryhill never provided an explanation for his 
alleged belief that "loan" meant anything other than the plain meaning of the word. At one 
point Berryhill testified that loan really meant equity, but he recanted that testimony while 
questioned by his counsel. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 660, L. 10 to p. 661, L. 7. 
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Even if "loan" really meant "equity" as Berryhill claims, when replacing the term "loan" 
with "equity" the remainder of the language in Exhibit 1 would be nonsensical. If MoselJ 
Equities' money was always equity and was applied to the buy-in, it would be unnecessary to 
later "transition" the money to any other form. Purchasing "equity" is buying interest in the 
company, so there would be no reason to transition "equity" to "equity." 
The only explanation for the plain language used in Exhibit I is the parties intended the 
funds to be loans and, that if they later agreed to buy-in terms, at thai time the funds would 
transition to equity. Mosell clearly expressed his understanding of the agreement when he wrote 
"loan" conspicuously on the checks he provided to Berryhill and so did Berryhill by accounting 
for these funds as loans on his company's books. 
II. JUDGE GOFF ALSO CORRECTLY GRANTED MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION 
JNOV BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT. 
In the alternative, Judge Goff also found that there was not "evidence of sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to 
that of the jury." 
A jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to 
that of the jury. In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for JNOV the court 
may not reweigh evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare its factual 
findings with that of the jury. The court reviews the facts as if the moving party 
had admitted any adverse facts, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party .... (cites omitted) This determination is a question of law. 
Karlson, 140 Idaho at 567, 97 P.3d at 434. 
Bratton v. Scott, Supreme Court Doc. No. 36275, p. 4-5 (2011). 
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Judge Goff stated the standard applicable when considering the motion for JNOV, and 
that he was required to consider only Berryhill's evidence. JNOV Tr. p. 91, L. 3-16. Judge Goff 
found that Berryhill's testimony and conduct in this case, and his testimony in the Broadway 
Park case [Mosell had paid the requisite funds, the only thing left was the paperwork] established 
that Berryhill believed there was a contract and that contract was evidenced by Exhibit 21. 
"Exhibit 21 is Jon Berryhill's evidence that he relies on to say what the intent was with 
regard to Exhibit 1 and all subsequent checks, which were offers and acceptance. So the Court 
does not see where the evidence - there's sufficient quality or probative value of the writ of the 
evidence, of Jon Berryhill's evidence to support the jury's verdict with regard to the first 
question asked, breach of contract of express contract." JNOV Tr. p. 98, L. 21 to p. 100, L. 5. 
Regardless of the plain meaning of "This is a loan" in Exhibit 1, or the accounting 
evidence, or General Manager Joy Luedtke's testimony that when Mosell asked for the loaned 
funds back Berryhill did not deny he owed the money and searched for sources of repayment, 
Judge Goff found that Berryhill's own testimony confirmed Berryhill's understanding there was 
a contract. 
Berryhill asserts Judge Goff did not grant Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV or new trial 
on Mosell Equities' unjust enrichment claim. However, that claim became moot upon the 
finding an express contract existed. Iron Eagle Development, LLe v. Quality Design Systems, 
Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509, (2003). Mosell Equities has an adequate legal remedy against 
Berryhill & Co. under the express agreement. 
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III. JUDGE GOFF PROPERLY GRANTED MOSELL EQUITIES' MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL. 
trial. 
Judge Goff applied the correct standard when he granted Mosell Equities' motion for new 
The district court is given broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new 
trial based on sufficiency of the evidence made pursuant to l.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.3d 88, 
93 (2001). In determining whether that discretion has been abused, this Court 
must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Id. While this Court must necessarily review the evidence, we 
have recognized limitations on our review: 
The trial court is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and 
testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence. Appellate 
review is necessarily more limited. While we must review the evidence, we are 
not in a position to "weigh" it as the trial court can. Id. (quoting Quick v. Crane, 
III Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986». 
Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Archilecls, 142 Idaho 797,800,134 P.3d 648, 651, (2006). 
Judge Goff stated during the JNOV hearing that he had identified and considered the 
relevant evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and discussed the evidence and testimony 
he considered persuasive. Judge Goff also identified the legal standards which applied to his 
decision. Finally, Judge Goff identified and discussed the facts and reasoning for his decision. 
A. PREJUDICIAL ERRORS WARRANT A NEW TRIAL -1.R.c.P. 59(a)(7). 
A district court must grant a motion for a new trial where errors in law occurred at trial. 
I.R.C.P.59(a)(7). 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) states a district court may grant a new trial 
for an "error in law, occurring at the trial." The district judge is vested with wide 
discretion to grant or deny a new trial where substantial rights of the aggrieved 
party are not affected and that party is not entitled to a new trial as a matter of 
right. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,645,39 P.3d 577, 585 (2001). 
Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, however, the district court has a 
duty to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Id. 
Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651, (2006). 
Judge Goff ruled as a matter of law the parties had created an express contract. 
Consequently, it was a prejudicial error not to have instructed the jury that an express contract 
existed. Such error denied Mosell Equities a fair trial and a new trial is therefore warranted. 
B. THE VERDICT WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE - I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted based on "[i]nsufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." In ruling on a 
motion, "the trial judge may grant a new trial based on l.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where, after he has 
weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, he 
concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the 
evidence." Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797, 802, 134 P.3d 648, 653, 
(2006), quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194, (1986). 
Judge Goff, although being diplomatic, found that Berryhill was not credible. 
[JNOY Tr., p. 92] 
] 7 ... And the Law talks about the 
18 probative values and - - rather, the requisite standard is 
19 whether the evidence is sufficient of quality and 
20 probative value that reasonable minds could reach the 
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21 same conclusion as did the jury/ 
22 So, when I analyze this, and based really 
23 upon Counsels' arguments today, it seemed to me, in 
24 trial and during the arguments today, that Berryhill 
25 wants to only take one side or one edge of the sword. If 
P.93 
1 you call something a loan in your handwriting, and 
2 you put in our own and instruct your own staff to 
3 insert it, whether you're a taxpayer, or for tax 
4 purposes, or for whatever, as a loan, than how can you 
5 not take the other side of the - - the deal that it is a 
6 loan. And that has bothered me from day one. 
In addition to identifying Berryhill's lack of credibility, Judge Goff was correct that the 
clear weight of the evidence established the parties intended the funds to remain a loan pending 
the finalization of the buy-in terms. "The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical 
interpretation of it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning." 
Mountainview Landowners Co-Op. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 865,136 P.3d 332, 336, (2006). 
Berryhill wrote in Exhibit 1, "This is a loan ... "; then accepted Exhibits 2-10, each of 
which is marked "loan"; and then accounted for the funds as loans. (Exhibit 53) 
Additionally, the Berryhill & Co. General Manager, Joy Luedtke, testified Berryhill told 
her to account for the money as loans. 
There were also the Meier documents, drafted by Berryhill & Co. 's legal counsel after 
meeting with Berryhill, which clearly stated Mosell Equities' money was a loan. 
And, there was also Luedtke's testimony, when Mosell asked for the money back, she 
and Berryhill reviewed the Berryhill & Co. finances to see if there was money available to repay 
Mosell Equities. 
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Finally, and perhaps the most compelling evidence is Berryhill's testimony that he did 
not believe Mosell Equities was just giving him the money. 
Berryhill contends the jury found there was not a loan, and that was supported by the 
evidence. "The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no 
simple loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 30. While Berryhill may argue "there was no simple loan transaction intended," he fails 
to present any evidence to support his claim there was not a loan. If "loan" did not mean an 
obligation to repay the funds if the buy-in did not occur, then what did it mean? Judge Goff 
certainly did not find any evidence that Berryhill believed loan meant anything but the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term. 
It is also undisputed that Berryhill & Co. transferred no equity to Mosell Equities. Judge 
Goff was correct there was not credible evidence presented that the agreement, Exhibit 1 and the 
subsequent checks marked loan, were intended by anyone to be anything other than a loan, 
which in some possible time in the future would be transitioned into equity, assuming that in 
some future time the parties actually agreed to buy-in terms. 
Again, no one disputes that the triggering event, the "buy-in," never occurred, so there 
was never the anticipated "transition" from loaned funds to equity. Berryhill, despite receiving 
$405,000.00 produced no evidence that Berryhill & Co. transferred a dime of equity to Mosell 
Equities. 
While Berryhill claimed MoseH Equities was "buying into my business," (although that is 
not what it says in Dan Williams' letter), Berryhill received $405,000 from Mosell Equities' and 
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Mosell Equities received nothing. Once again, if Mosell Equities was "buying into my 
business," and that buy in was not completed, what legal basis does Berryhill have to keep the 
money? When asked at trial if Berryhill thought he could just keep the money if the buy in did 
not occur, he responded "no." However that is exactly what he is asserting on this appeal. 
Berryhill also claims that Glenn Mosell referred to the funds as an "investment/-
divestment" in communications with Berryhill in the latter part of 2009. Mosell testified he used 
those terms based on having heard Berryhill's testimony during the Broadway Park case that 
Mosell Equities already had an equity interest; Mosell had paid in the funds, all that was left to 
do was the paper work. When Berryhill refused to acknowledge Mosell Equities' interest, or 
transfer the promised equity, then MoseH Equities demanded repayment of the loaned funds. 
IV. DAN WILLIAMS' LETTER IS ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH BERRYHILL. 
During the trial, Berryhill testified Mosel! Equities was buying into Berryhill & Co. 
However, that is certainly not what Berryhill communicated to Mosell Equities in April 20 I O. 
Berryhill denied Mosell Equities' funds were a loan and denied Mosell Equities was entitled to 
any equity. Assuming Berryhill's contention at trial was true that Berryhill believed Mosell 
Equities was "buying into my business," then it would appear that Berryhill should have 
communicated that contention through his counsel and then identified what terms that he 
believed Mosell Equities needed to satisfy to consummate the buy-in. In other words, if 
Berryhill believed Mosell Equities still owed money to satisfy the buy-in amount, then why the 
lack of demand in Williams' letter? 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief - 33 
Assuming that Mr. Williams intended the letter for settlement negotiations or to convey 
settlement terms, he would have included Rule 408 disclaimer language in the letter. Moreover, 
Mr. Williams makes his intent clear in the very first paragraph; "There are a number of 
inaccuracies and mischaracterizations in that correspondence, which I will respond to for you." 
Thus, Mr. William's letter does not contain "Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to 
furnish, or (2) accepting, offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount," which would implicate Rule 408. The letter is a denial that there ever was a loan or 
that Mosell Equities was entitled to any equity in Berryhill & Co. and should have been admitted 
at least to impeach Berryhill's testimony at trial. 
If the Court affirms Judge Goff and orders a new trial, Mosell Equities respectfully 
requests this Court order on remand that Dan Williams' letter is admissible, at least for 
impeachment purposes. 
A TTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent Mosell Equities respectfully requests attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-
120(3). This case involves an agreement to purchase equity in a business and therefore the 
"gravamen" of the claim addresses a commercial transaction. Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001). 
CONCLUSION 
Mosell Equities respectfully requests the Court AFFIRM Judge Goffs decisions granting 
a JNOV on Count 1 and granting a new trial. Mosell Equities also requests the Court direct the 
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District Court on remand that Dan Williams' letter is admissible, at least for impeachment 
purposes. 
CROSS APPEAL 
The Cross Appellant Mosell Equities hereby incorporates the Statement of the Case 
section of its Respondent's Brief as if set forth herein. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL 
I. Whether Judge Goff should have granted Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV 
on Count 1 in its entirety and found both an express contract and breach of 
that contract? 
2. Whether Mosell Equities is entitled to attorney fees on Cross Appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
Judge Goff was correct in granting Mosell Equities' motions for JNOV and for new trial. 
However, Mosel! Equities contends another trial is not necessary. 
On remand, as a contract exists as a matter of law, the only issues remaining for litigation 
would be whether the "buy-in" had occurred or whether there was a breach of the loan 
agreement. 
First, there is no question the buy-in did not occur, or that the parties signed any documents 
that would have caused Berryhill & Co. to transfer Mosell Equities' money, accounted for as debt 
on Berryhill & Co. 's financial records, to an equity interest in that company. 
Second, considering Berryhill's previous trial testimony where he could not identify just 
what terms were missing from the Meier documents, what additional evidence could Berryhill 
provide at a new trial? If the buy-in documents were not correct, so Berryhill refused to sign, 
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and Berryhill cannot specify just why he did not sign, then what would change in a subsequent 
trial? The reality, the "buy-in" the parties anticipated happening in the future is never going to 
happen, regardless of a new trial. 
Consequently, the only issue left for consideration at a new trial is whether Berryhill & 
Co. breached the loan agreement when it denied through counsel any loan existed and refused to 
repay. However, that issue is resolved on this appeal. Berryhill concedes the obvious, if the jury 
had found the contract was a loan, based on the fact Berryhill denied the contract was a loan and 
refused to repay the money, the jury undoubtedly would have also found a breach. 
I. BERRYHILL CONCEDES IF THERE WAS A LOAN, THEN THERE WAS A 
BREACH. 
"The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no 
simple loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. 
If they had found a loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a breach 
in answer to Question No.1 on the Special Verdict. (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, LL 20-
23) and damages in some amount in answer to Question No.2. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 30. (Emphasis added) 
Berryhill must be referring to Dan Williams' letter in April 2009 in which Berryhill 
denied there was a loan or that Mosell Equities was entitled to any equity in Berryhill & Co. 
"Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of law reviewed de novo." 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361,93 P.3d 685,692 (2004). Obviously, 
if a party to a loan denies the loan exists, as did Berryhill, and refuses to repay the funds, there is 
a breach, as Berryhill concedes. If there is a contract, and an admitted breach, what is left to 
decide on remand? 
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II. THERE IS NO DISPUTE NO BUY-IN DID OR COULD HAVE OCCURRED 
BECAUSE BERRYHILL REFUSED TO FINALIZE THE BUY-IN DOCUMENTS. 
Berryhill claims Mosel! Equities' money was to go towards a buy-in, but in the same 
breath Berryhill testified the agreement was never signed because the buy-in documents were not 
correct. Then the evidence establishes Berryhill did nothing to try and correct the loan 
documents or to finalize the buy-in. At trial, Berryhill could not tell the jury what he believed 
were the terms. As Judge Goff explained in his decision, " ... life is a two-edged sword, double-
edged sword. It cuts both ways. There's always some benefit and there's always some not so 
benefit. There's always some pros, there's always some cons. There's always an advantage and 
a disadvantage." JNOV Tr. p. 92, L. 3-7. He went on to conclude Berryhill just wanted to take 
one side of the sword. 
As Berryhill has not tendered any buy-in documents or in any manner sought to 
consummate the buy-in, and as the parties' relationship is acrimonious at best and a future 
business relationship is out of the question, then on remand there would never be a possibility of 
the "transition" stated in Exhibit 1 occurring. Consequently, Mosell Equities' money remains a 
loan to Berryhill & Co, and nothing would change at a new trial. 
III. BERRYHILL'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Berryhill contended at trial that he would never have done anything except for "Polo 
Cove." "Everything was about Polo Cove." However, Berryhill testified that Mosel! never 
guaranteed the success of the Polo Cove project or misrepresented any facts related to that 
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project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 475, L 15-22. As Judge Goff found, Polo Cove "is really nothing." JNOV 
Tr., p. 19, L. 7-8. 
The first element of the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel requires Berryhill to 
prove a false statement. "The plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the 
defendant." (Jury Instruction No. 20.) However, Berryhill testified Mosell made no false 
representations about Polo Cove. 
Berryhill also contends Mosell' s alleged statement; "we have to call it something" 
somehow misled Berryhill into believing "loan" really did not mean loan, but some other and 
still undefined term. There is no substantial and competent evidence to establish, assuming 
Mosell did make this statement, that the statement was false or misleading. The reality, under 
the circumstances of the parties' relationship is the funds had to be either loans or payment for 
equity in the company. Despite Berryhill's contention there were other possibilities, which he is 
still unable to identify, that is the only rational and logical conclusion. "We have to call it 
something" suggests the reality that as the parties had not finalized the buy-in agreement, they 
could not call the funds "equity." Consequently, as the parties could not call the funds "equity," 
"we have to call it something" merely referred to identifying the funds as "loans," which 
Berryhill acknowledged understanding by drafting Exhibit 1 and accounting for these funds as 
loans. Berryhill also testified he did not believe Mosell Equities was not just giving him the 
money, so he had to have understood there would be consequences-either Berryhill would have 
to pay the funds back to Mosell Equities or he would have to transfer equity in the company. 
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There simply is no proof that the statement "we have to call it something" is a misrepresentation 
or a false statement. 
IV. BERRYHILL'S "NO MEETING OF THE MINDS" DEFENSE WARRANTS 
RESCISSION. 
Finally, even if the Court on appeal were to disagree with Judge Gotl and rule the jury 
could have found there was no "meeting of the minds" to create an express contract, then the 
proper remedy is rescission. 
Mosell Equities steadfastly asserted it had loaned funds to Berryhill and therefore it was 
entitled to recover those funds, plus statutory accumulated interest. Despite the verdict however, 
Mosell Equities is not without entitlement to the equitable remedy of rescission. In O'Connor v. 
Harger Const., inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846, (2008), the Supreme Court ruled a court has 
equitable power to grant rescission even where that party had not pled a claim of rescission, as 
long as the defendant had raised a defense from which rescission would apply, and the parties 
presented evidence to support or refute that defense to avoid the parties' contract. While the 
defense in a 'Conner was mutual mistake, rescission is equally available when a party seeks to 
avoid a contact using the "no meeting of the minds" defense. Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho 
357,597 P.2d 600, (1979). 
Here, Mosel! Equities had performed and delivered $405,000.00 to Berryhill. Berryhill 
sought to avoid the contract by alleging there was no meeting of the minds, and now contends 
there was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict that no contract 
existed. If no contract did exist, the Court must return the parties to their pre-contracting 
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positions. Mosell Equities is therefore entitled to an order on remand, if the Court reverses Judge 
Goff, directing Berryhill & Co. to immediately return all of Mosel! Equities' $405,000.00. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON CROSS APPEAL 
Cross Appellant Mosel! Equ ities respectfull y requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3). This case involves an agreement to purchase equity in a business and therefore the 
"gravamen" of the claim addresses a commercial transaction. Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (200 1). 
CONCLUSION 
While Mosell Equities agrees with Judge Goffs decisions below, it contends on appeal 
there is no reason for a new trial. Nothing will change; the money Mosell Equities paid to 
Berryhill & Co. is a loan and the transition to equity in Berryhill & Co. the parties envisioned in 
2007 will never happen. Then, Berryhill admits the obvious in his Brief that if there was a loan, 
there was a breach because Berryhill refused to repay the loan. Again, these facts will not 
change on remand. 
Mosell Equities respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM Judge Goffs decision 
granting a JNOV on Count 1, but remand with directions that the District Court enter Judgment 
on Count 1 for $405,000.00 against Berryhill & Co. There is no question there was a loan, 
Berryhill & Co. breached, and Mosell Equities is entitled to recover the $405,000.00 it loaned to 
Berryhill & Co. 
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RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 22nd day of March, 2012. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
/ 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Respondent-Cross Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of March, 2012, I served the foregoing, by 
having two true and complete copies delivered via the manner indicated to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th S1. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Hand Delivered 
Il 
APR. 2.2009 3:58PM 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS 
& PARK_ 
April 2. 2009 
VIA TELEFAX: 938-9504 & U.S. MAJL 
Paul R. Mangiantini 
Manglantini &. Slomialc., LLP 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Dr., Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
RE: Glenn Mosell 
Dear Paul: 
NO. 6262 P. 1 
I'm writing In response to your letter of Februaxy 20,2009. There ar:e a number of 
inaccuracies and mischaraetcdz.ations in that correspondence, which 1 will respond to for you. 
First and fOl'Cmost, the funds described in your letter and claimed by Mr. Mosell or 
Mosell Equities, LLC. did not constitute a loan to lohn Berryhill or Berryhill &: Co., Inc. 
("Berryhills" or "Berryhill & Co,"). I believe you win find no note, no security terms, no 
repayment terms, no interest rate, nor any of the other specific terms necessary in order to sustain 
the concrete requisites of a Do1UJjide loan: Rather. despite the parties' inabnity to come to terms 
on any particular written contractual relationship. you will find that the extensive course of 
dealing indicates that the relevant funds constituted an investment by Moscll Equities. u..c, in a 
speculative venrure dealing with the proposed development of Polo Cove near Sunnyslope in 
Canyon County I Idaho. 
Apparendy, Mr. Mosell is a developer and was interested in pursuing !he :Folo Cove 
project He fU'St contacted John Berryhill in approximately July of 2005 to ask him if he would 
put a restaurant in the development Over many months of discussions, it was agreed tha.t there 
would be Ii joint venture to develop Polo Cove with Mr. Mosell as the "money" man and Mr. 
Berryhill as a day-t<rday operations man. Over the next many months, Mr. Berryhill devoted 
substantial time to woIking on tM project, meeting with architects, designers, potential vendors. 
vintnus, hotel devdopers, as well as other interested parties. Mr. Moscll constantly assured Mr. 
Berryhill that he would "take care of' Mr. Benyhill and that they would get "everything in 
writing". The roughly t:bree years worth of emails and other documents in the possession of your 
client substantiate the enormous amount of time Mt Benybill devoted to this VCIlture, for which 
he was not paid. 
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At that time, Benyhill &; Co. operated a restaurant at the Broadway PaIk Shopping Center 
in Boise. As prut of the Polo Cove venture, Mr. Mosell eventually insisted that Mr. Beu:yhill 
move the restaurant to downtown to a site that would imp:n:ss people he wanted to interest in 
Polo Cove, in addition to planning a new restaurant at the Polo Cove site. Mr. MoseJl wanted to 
"splash the pol" Mr. Berryhill made it very clear that the move was too big a financial step for 
him to take on himself. Mr. Mosell reptesentcd that he was not going anywhere, that together 
they had "big things" to do. 11u:oughout the construction of the new Berryhills restaurant Mr. 
Mosell told Mr. Berryhill not to "cheap out," not to worry about the cost of the buildout. "go 
big," "do it sexy." A good portion of the funds identified in your letter were dedicated to this 
buildout. 
Potential investors and other interested parties were wined and dined by Mr. MoseU at the 
restaurant without charge. Mr. MoseU signed a letter of intent with Tomlinson & Associates for 
additional space on the ground floor of the same downtown building near the restaurant for a 
Polo Cove showroom, although:Mr. BenybiU advised him it was too big. Mr. BenyhiU told Mr. 
Mosell that this addition would considerably increase their llabmties. Mr. Mosell responded that 
Mr. Berryhill was not looking at .. the big pictUre." Mr. Mosell could use the space for Polo Cove 
promotions in the day and Berrybills could usc it for banquet and IeCeption facilities in the 
evening. Mr. Mosell ordered expensive fwniture for the space and Beayhilb had to cover the 
remaining balf of the cost of this furniture upon delivery. Berryhills is still being charged rent for 
this additional space. 
Mr. Mosell began paying bis rent for the promotional area at later and later times each 
month and bad not paid fOl: Polo Cove's portion of thebuildoul Then the Polo Cove meetings 
stopped. Potential investors stopped coming to the restaurant. Others involved in Polo Cove 
started asking Mr. Berryhill a.bout Mr. Mosell, saying he would not return their calls and they had 
not been paid for their work. The funds identified in yOur letter included some amounts paid to 
attorneys to draft contrads between Berryhill &; Co., Inc., and Moscl1 Equities, lLC, wblch were 
not executed. It is my understanding that an amoun.t owed to attorney K.illl Gourl~ is still 
unpaid. 
You Will also note that earlier Kim Gourley started out reprc:se.nting both Mosell Equities, 
lLC, and Mr. Berryhill as oo.buyers in a lawsuit axising from a Putchase and Sale Agn:ement 
relating to the Broadway Park Shopping Center, where Berryhill$ than was located (Mr. Gourley 
was later replaced). At Mr. Mosen's urging,litigation was initiated, which was unsuccessful. 
Part of the funds that Mr. Mosen is now seeking repayment was for attorney fees arising out of 
this case. 
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Although it is txue that certain documents reference "loans" by either Glen Mosell or 
Mosell Bqu.iti~. Inc., you will find that the "loan" label was attached because of instructions 
from Mr. Mosell himself to Berryhills' bookkeeper without Mr. Berryhill's involvement. As 
such, they xepresent nothing more than a label that Mr. Mosell unilaterally appUed to the funds. 
If we calculate the additional costs for whirh Mr. Beayhill is responsible. including 
increased rent, buildout of additional space, as wen as the enormous contribution of time 
expended by Mr. Berryhill in the Polo Cove venture. the B~ills contribution exceeds that 
identified by Mr. Mosell. Moreover. without Mr. Mosell's inducements into the Polo Cove 
venture. Berryhills would still be operating at Broadway with much reduced expenses and 
attendant risk. Because of Mr. Mosell's inducements and representations. Ben:yhills is 
responsible for much greater operating expenses in a very challenging environment for 
restaurants. 
In short., Mr. Mosell is now asking John Be.rryhill or Be.rrybW & Co. to refund a good part 
of his speculative investment in Polo Cove, as if Bcnyhills was a guarantor of that investmenl 
Based on the course of dealing between the parties. it is clear that BeD')'bill& was no such 
guarantor or borrower. We believe that, after an exhaustive review of the oo\ltSe of dealing 
involved here over three years, a jut)' will find that theIe WeIC no "loans." Accordingly, we must 
decline your client's invitation to reimburse him for his own in~lment in this failed venture. 
Daniel E; Williams 
DEW:g 
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